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Internationally, the human right to physical integrity and the ethical 
principle of autonomy and, hence, the ability of a competent adult 
patient to refuse medical treatment, are the subjects of frequent 
debate, because the limits of this right and the ethical principle, when 
applied in concrete situations, remain unclear. In South Africa (SA) 
aspects of the complex ethical and legal debate were revisited on 
30 April 2015 when judgment was handed down in the North 
Gauteng High Court which declared it legal for Robert Stransham-
Ford to ask a medical practitioner to help him end his life and, in doing 
so, upholding Robert Stransham-Ford’s rights to dignity, physical inte-
grity and his autonomy.[1] Stransham-Ford refused medical treatment 
in the form of strong sedatives because he wanted to die while aware 
of his surroundings.[1] The judgment is a victory, not only for those 
who advocate the right of competent adult persons to seek active 
euthanasia in specific circumstances, but also for claims of patient 
autonomy and patients’ right to reach their own decisions regarding 
their medical treatment, including their right to refuse treatment.
The Stransham-Ford judgment, may indeed pave the way to 
legalising active euthanasia in selected cases in SA. Equally impor-
tantly, the Stransham-Ford judgment has brought to the fore the 
debate on the right of a competent adult person to refuse medical 
treatment both as an expression of his/her (human) right to physical 
integrity and of the ethical principle of autonomy. In light of the 
importance of the judgment the article presents a legal analysis of 
the right to physical integrity as guaranteed by the SA Constitution 
1996,[2] and the subsequent right to refuse medical treatment in SA 
law. The purpose, therefore, is not to argue for the legalisation of 
active euthanasia but rather to analyse the legal position pertaining 
to the refusal of medical treatment. We will consider whether the 
right to refuse treatment is an absolute right, and very briefly reflect 
on the application of the constitutional limitations clause to this right. 
Further, instances where patients’ right to physical integrity is limited 
by factors that detract from (patient) autonomy will be considered as 
these represent a limitation of their right to refuse medical treatment.
It should be noted that, although we refer to the right to physical 
integrity as an expression of patient autonomy, we will not be 
examining the ethical principle of autonomy directly, as this is 
intended primarily as a legal analysis and not an ethical one. We 
realise that the two systems (law and ethics) are commensurable 
and cannot be separated. Further, in this context it is important 
to distinguish between advance directives and more (immediate) 
refusals of treatment. For the purposes of this article we refer to 
‘refusal’ as including both an advance directive and an immediate 
refusal (unless the context specifically indicates otherwise).
The refusal of medical treatment as 
expression of patient autonomy
Although often mentioned internationally, and in SA, in the context of 
the debate regarding active euthanasia (or physician-assisted sui cide), 
the patient’s right to refuse medical treatment has not received nearly 
as much attention as its counterpart: the patient’s right to consent to 
treatment. Moreover, in everyday medical practice many South 
Africans continue, blindly and uncritically, to follow a doctor’s 
advice and submit to medical treatment, most probably because for 
the great majority of South Africans healthcare services are a luxury and 
usually unattainable. Consequently, patients do not consider that the 
treatment they are being advised to undergo may not be in their best 
interest, which promotes the culture of a blind acceptance of ‘doctor’s 
instructions’. Certainly, such an attitude is not conducive to an open 
and engaged and shared decision-making process, in a situation in 
which the assurance of treatment is limited to a lucky few.[3]
The principle of pat ient  ‘autonomy’ is a long-standing principle 
of medical law: the word is derived from the Greek words autos, 
meaning self, and nomos, meaning to rule or govern.[4] Thus, the 
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principle of self-rule is a right bestowed on all persons; in the SA 
sphere by section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of SA.[2] 
It is commonly accepted that there are two facets to the principle of 
patient autonomy, namely the ability to act independently from 
third parties and the ability to act intentionally.[5] What it means is 
that a patient must be able to make a decision concerning his or 
her own body without undue interference, from a medical prac-
titioner, family member, societal leader or any other source. It also 
pre supposes that limitations, such as a lack of understanding of one’s 
disease, treatment, prognosis or any other factor, are absent. Then, and 
only then, can a patient be said to act autonomously.[5]
The obligation to respect the autonomy of a patient has been 
concretised in the Health Professions Council of SA (HPCSA)’s General 
Ethical Guidelines.[6] Thirteen ‘core ethical values and stan dards’,[6] 
which medical practitioners are obliged to abide by, are listed in the 
Guidelines. The relevant aspects here include the obligation to respect 
a patient’s right to self-determination and the obligation to respect 
human rights in general.[6] As the right to physical integrity, including 
the ability to make autonomous decisions regarding one’s own body, 
is enshrined in the Bill of Rights,[2] medical practitioners have a general 
legal obligation to respect this right. The HPCSA Guidelines further, 
significantly, instruct medical practitioners to be tolerant of and to have 
respect for differing ethical, religious and moral views.[6] This instruction 
re-enforces the principle of respect for autonomy, discussed above, 
which states that medical practitioners acknowledge that the patient 
has the right to have independent views.
The right to physical integrity
The right to physical integrity, as enshrined in section 12(2)(b) of 
the SA Constitution, is the foundation on which jurisprudence 
con cer ning patient autonomy – and the right to refuse treatment – 
rests. Section 12(2)(b) states: ‘everyone has the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, which includes the right … to security in and 
control over their body’. This right is supplemented in the National 
Health Act,[7] particularly in the sections dealing with informed 
consent (sections 6 - 9), case law regarding informed consent and 
refusal of treatment, ethical guidelines, and various scholarly writings 
on the subject.
The right to physical integrity amounts essentially to a ‘right to 
be left alone’;[8] in other words, a right to make decisions concerning 
one’s body without undue interference by others. Section 12(2)(b) of 
the Constitution states that everyone has the right to both security in 
and control over their body. These phrases confer a cluster of rights on 
a patient in the healthcare context. The right to security in one’s body 
prevents unwanted disturbance of bodily integrity, as would arise in 
the situation where a patient is forced to undergo treatment; whereas 
the right to control over the body amounts to the ability to make 
choices regarding the body in an autonomous and independent 
manner.[8] The right to control over the body would be frustrated, for 
instance, if a patient is coerced or unduly influenced into making 
a decision regarding their body, or is not given the option of making 
the decision at all.
The right to bodily integrity applies in all spheres of life. In 
a healthcare context, this right necessitates a right to give (or 
withhold) informed consent before any procedure is undertaken, or 
another process affecting one’s body begins.[9] Herring points out that 
this right must not be interpreted too expansively; he presents the 
example that a patient has the right to choose whether to undergo 
treatment or not, but does not have the right to determine exactly 
what course of treatment is necessary.[10] This distinction seems only 
logical – a patient does not demand that she/he is treated according 
to their own layman’s knowledge rather that the expert advice of 
the medical practitioner.
How far does this right stretch? Limiting 
the right to physical integrity
It is trite law that the right to physical integrity, like other (human) 
rights in the Bill of Rights, may be limited (or taken away from) under 
certain circumstances. The limitation of rights is a necessity for a 
functional and effective system of government. Nevertheless, such 
a limitation of rights cannot be undertaken in an arbitrary manner 
or without regulation. Section 36 of the Constitution functions as a 
safeguard of individual rights as it ensures that government, or other 
entities which limit rights, are held accountable and are made to 
comply with certain standards before conduct, which limits rights, will 
be accepted as valid.
Section 36 of the Constitution contains the general limitation 
clause applicable to all rights contained in the Bill of Rights and 
which prescribes the permissible means of limiting rights in the 
Constitution. This means that every time a limitation of a person’s 
physical integrity is contemplated or occurs, judicial intervention is 
possible to measure the limitation against section 36, and so ensure 
compliance with the Constitution.
Specific instances of limitation of the right to physical integrity 
and the right to refuse treatment are discussed below.
Forced medical treatment as a limitation 
of the right to physical integrity: How far 
does the right to say ‘no’ go?
As has been mentioned above, the right to physical integrity, like any 
other right in the Constitution, may be limited. Forcing an unwilling 
patient to submit to medical treatment represents the ultimate 
limitation of that person’s physical integrity. There are several possible 
entities or situations which may result in the limitation of a person’s 
physical integrity; each is examined below.
The state
Thomas Hobbes is credited as the originator of the idea of a social 
contract between a state and its citizens;[11] this social contract finds 
a fitting analogy in compulsory medical treatment authorised by the 
state. The state, on occasion, forces an individual or group to undergo 
medical treatment or procedures for a reason deemed acceptable by 
society. There are several reasons why a government would see fit to 
compel certain persons to undergo medical treatment against their 
will, such as in the interests of justice and public safety. Each of these 
is examined in more detail below.
Collection of evidence: Blood samples
In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act,[12] a criminal court may order 
the taking of, inter alia, a blood sample from an accused (whose 
trial is pending before that Court) in order to determine the state 
of that accused’s health[13] or to ascertain whether the accused bears 
any mark, characteristic or feature.[13] Reasonable force may be used 
where such accused does not co-operate, in other words, when 
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the accused refuses medical treatment.[14] The constitutionality of the 
use of force to obtain blood samples was challenged in S v Orrie,[15] 
where the Court held, although it amounted to a limitation of the 
accused’s bodily integrity, that drawing blood against the consent of 
the accused was a very limited infringement of that right. The Court 
also held that the limitation was justified in the circumstances, being 
necessary for the procurement of potential evidence and thus in 
the interests of justice, as well as being sanctioned by legislation 
(paragraph 23).[15]
Blood samples may also be required for evidence in civil matters, 
particularly in an instance where paternity of a child is disputed. 
There is no express provision authorising the drawing of the blood of 
a potential father in such a case; however, section 37 of the Children’s 
Act[16] provides that a Court may make a negative inference as to the 
credibility of a person refusing to submit to such a test. Although 
this sanction is not as stringent as in a criminal trial, it would certainly 
serve as a strong motivating factor in favour of the blood test being 
performed. It is clear, in spite of the more lenient nature of this 
provision, that a potential father could be forced to undergo the 
required tests by applying the limitations clause read with section 
28(2) of the Constitution. Section 28(2) provides that the best 
interests of the child are of ‘paramount importance’ in every matter 
concerning that child. Therefore, provided the applicant can prove 
that certainty regarding paternity is in the child’s best interest, a Court 
will likely apply section 36 and limit the potential father’s right to 
bodily integrity so as to fulfil the requirements of the so-called ‘best 
interests standard’ set out in section 28(2).
In civil matters, when DNA evidence or other blood (or similar) 
tests are required, the standard limitation assessment will occur in 
order to determine whether, in the absence of an express statutory 
authorisation, an unwilling individual can be forced to undergo 
those tests.
Collection of evidence: Other materials
Two cases reported a year apart focussed on the issue of court-
sanctioned surgery for the retrieval of evidence. These cases dealt 
with an accused that was shot during or shortly after the commission 
of a crime, leaving a bullet in his leg, which could provide crucial 
evidence in the case against him. In both cases, the accused refused 
to consent to surgery to remove the bullet.
In Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa[17] the respondent was 
allegedly shot by one of two victims during the commission of a 
robbery-murder. The bullet lodged in the respondent’s left thigh close 
to the femur. He was inconsistent in his explanation of the obvious 
wound and X-rays performed by the District Surgeon clearly showed 
the presence of a bullet in the tissue of the thigh (paragraphs 655A - 
656D).[17] Expert witnesses indicated that the bullet was possibly the 
same calibre as those fired from the gun used by the victim to shoot 
the attacker (paragraphs 655A - 656D).[17] Further expert testimony 
indicated that the procedure required to remove the bullet was 
relatively safe and uncomplicated (paragraphs 658H 658A - C).[17]
Various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act were relied 
upon by the applicants in attempting to show that the accused 
should be compelled to undergo surgery.[18] For the purposes of 
this discussion it suffices to say that the applicants relied on 
the provisions allowing for the use of force, first, in conducting a 
search, and second, in determining the condition or appearance of an 
individual (paragraph 658H).[17] The applicants relied on section 205(3) 
of the Constitution as well, which mandates the police to investigate 
crimes occurring in the Republic, by stating that it was impossible for 
the police to investigate the matter any further without inspecting 
the bullet lodged in the respondent’s leg.[2]
In its decision, the Court held that surgery without consent is a 
grave infringement of the bodily integrity, privacy and dignity of the 
accused (paragraph 658H).[17] It then relied on the American case of 
Winston v Lee,[19] wherein the US Supreme Court stated – in much 
the same circumstances –  that the reasonableness of forced surgery 
must be determined by weighing up the interests of the individual 
(specifically their privacy and bodily integrity) and the interests of 
society (the need to acquire evidence in order to prosecute crime).
Therefore, the determination of whether the surgery should be 
mandated by the Court becomes an exercise in the balancing of rights. 
In this specific case there were several factors weighing in favour of 
the surgery taking place, namely that it was an investigation of a 
very serious crime (both victims of the robbery died of their injuries); 
that there was no other evidence linking the accused and the crime; 
and that the required procedure had only minimal risks (paragraph 
659B - C).[17] The Court concluded, as a result of these factors, that 
the public interest, namely the investigation of serious crimes, was 
more important than the respondent’s interest, namely protection of 
his bodily integrity, privacy and dignity, and ordered the respondent 
to consent to the surgery, failing which the Sheriff was to give 
consent on his behalf (paragraph 680A).[17]
The second case based on similar facts is that of Minister of Safety 
and Security v Xaba.[20] The Xaba judgement was handed down just 
ten months after the Gaqa decision. In Xaba, the accused and another 
allegedly hijacked a vehicle that was spotted later the same day, and 
the police gave chase. S hots were fired but the driver of the vehicle 
(the accused) escaped. An informant came forward with information 
that the accused had been shot in the thigh and that the bullet 
was believed to be lodged there. The accused was arrested and 
X-rays confirmed the presence of a bullet in his thigh. He refused to 
consent to surgery to facilitate the removal of the bullet to be used 
as evidence against him (paragraphs 706F - 707G).[20] The applicant 
relied on the same provisions as in Gaqa relating to the use of force in 
searching or ascertaining the appearance or condition of an individual 
(paragraph 713A).[20]
In this case the court followed a formalistic approach, basing its 
finding on a technical reading of the legislation and holding that 
the phrase – ‘including the taking of a blood sample’ in section 37 
of the Criminal Procedure Act – showed the legislature’s intention 
that taking a blood sample was the only medical procedure allowed 
in terms of this section. Surgery, such as that required to remove 
the bullet from the accused’s leg, was not justified by section 37 
(paragraph 714D - F).[20] The Court further held, in the absence of 
a supplied definition, that the word ‘search’ in section 27 had to be 
given its ordinary meaning, which does not include surgery or other 
medical procedures (paragraph 713A).[20] The court refused to allow 
the surgery to go ahead (paragraph 715B).[20]
In our opinion, the Court in Gaqa followed the more desirable 
approach to this problem, as it focused on balancing rights and 
interests. Although the technical reading of legislation, certainly, 
remains a vital function of the judiciary, the Xaba decision passed over 
a valuable opportunity to settle an area of human rights law. Judge 
Desai, in handing down judgement in Gaqa, applied clearly and 
concisely the provisions relating to the limitation of rights, whereas 
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Acting Judge Southwood (as he then was) appears to have neglected 
to consider the impact of his judgement on the interests of the 
community.
Compulsory HIV testing of alleged sexual 
offenders
In terms of section 30 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act[21] the victim of a sexual offence (or another 
interested person) may apply within 90 days of the offence to a 
Magistrate’s Court, with jurisdiction to compel the alleged offender 
to undergo HIV testing and to allow the results of such test to be 
disclosed to the victim. This application must be in writing, setting 
out the alleged sexual offence, the identity of the alleged offender, 
the fact that the matter had been reported within 72 hours and the 
possible exposure of the victim to HIV, according to section 30(2)(a).[21]
The consent of the alleged offender is not required despite the fact 
that this provision represents an infringement of his dignity, privacy 
and bodily integrity. The Act goes so far as to state in section 38(2) that 
an alleged offender who refuses to consent to the taking of samples is 
guilty of an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment of not more 
than 3 years.[21] While this is not an express statutory authorisation for 
forced treatment, the possibility of 3 years’ imprisonment is a weighty 
factor coercing an accused to submit to the procedure.[22]
Serious public health threats
One of the more settled aspects of the jurisprudence related to 
forced treatment is treatment without consent in the face of an 
epidemic, such as extreme drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) or 
the recent Ebola outbreak. Section 7(1)(d) of the National Health 
Act details circumstances in which treatment may be administered 
without the consent of the patient, including a case where a failure 
to treat the patient (or group of patients) would lead to a serious 
public health or safety risk. This provision was applied in the context 
of XDR-TB, in the case of Minister of Health v Goliath.[23] In this case, 
the respondents had all been diagnosed with XDR-TB, which was 
resistant to ‘first-line drugs’ and to certain other drugs. They were 
all contagious and all had failed to comply with the voluntary 
treatment regimen prescribed for them (paragraphs 16 - 17).[23] As 
a result, the Minister of Health applied for an order compelling the 
surviving respondents (two of the original four respondents had 
died) to be detained in a specialist tuberculosis hospital to receive 
treatment (paragraphs 5 - 6).[23]
The respondents, in turn, claimed that the detention represented 
a violation of their rights in terms of section 12 of the Constitution, 
including their rights to freedom and security of the person and 
to bodily integrity (paragraph 14).[23] The court considered various 
factors, including the Minister of Health’s duty to prevent and control 
the spread of communicable diseases; that the respondents were 
capable of spreading the disease but had failed to adhere to the 
voluntary programme; and the toxicity and associated side-effects 
of the drugs necessary to treat XDR-TB (paragraph 27).[23] Judge 
Griesel ruled, based on these considerations, that the detention and 
treatment of the respondents, although a breach of their section 12 
rights, were both necessary and mandated by section 7(1)(d) of the 
National Health Act because of the public interest.[23]
The Goliath judgement received academic support: Carstens writes 
that the effect of the decision, specifically within the spectrum of the 
tuberculosis epidemic in SA, is that considerations of public health 
trump the bodily integrity of individual patients.[24]
Based on the decision in Goliath it appears, if a medical interven-
tion is necessary to protect broader society, that the rights of an 
individual patient are not grounds for the refusal of treatment. The 
patient may be forced to undergo treatment against their express 
wishes, and, as has been explained above, rights may be limited 
where such limitation serves an important purpose.
Maintenance claims
A duty of maintenance exists both between spouses (and in some 
cases former spouses) and between parent and child.[25] If a parent or 
spouse, as the case may be, is unable to fulfil this duty, the inability 
must be tangible and must not be due to that person’s failure to 
recognise their full earning potential.[26] This means, if a person 
elects not to undergo certain medical treatment to the detriment of 
their earning capacity, that they c o u l d  possibly be in breach of their 
duty to provide maintenance. Therefore, again, a r ights-limitation 
investigation will have to occur – the child’s (or spouse’s) right to 
maintenance will have to be weighed against the right of the other 
party to bodily integrity.
Regarding the maintenance of a spouse or former spouse, it is 
unlikely that the courts will force a person to undergo treatment 
against their wishes in order to maintain a healthy and employable 
adult. However, the position is somewhat more clouded with regard 
to children. Section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that the 
best interests of the child are of ‘paramount importance’ in every 
matter involving the child. This provision, coupled with the 
Constitutional right to maintenance,[2] declares a more significant 
purpose to the potential limitation of the parent’s right to bodily 
integrity. Ultimately, every case will have to be determined on the 
circumstances: facts such as whether the other parent can provide 
maintenance, whether the child is old enough to work and t o 
contribute to her own maintenance and the dangers and risks of the 
treatment required by the parent.
Patient’s employer
Medical incapacity is potentially fair grounds for dismissal from 
employment:[27] in some circumstances it may lead to the automatic 
termination of the employment relationship as a result of supervening 
impossibility of performance.[27] An employer, upon discovering the 
medical incapacity of the employee, has an obligation to conduct 
an investigation into whether there exists an alternative post for 
that employee, or whether the employee’s existing duties may be 
modified to compensate for the medical condition or disability of the 
employee.[28] In these circumstances,  an employer is entitled to 
request an employee to undergo a medical examination but may not 
compel her to do so.[27] This, then, is not a true case of forced medical 
treatment.
It should be noted that the right to bodily integrity includes a 
right to make decisions concerning reproduction.[2] This specific facet 
of the right to bodily integrity is given effect to by section 187(1)(e) 
of the Labour Relations Act,[29] which provides that an employee may 
not be dismissed as a result of her pregnancy or intended pregnancy. 
It has been submitted that this section indicates the legislature’s 
intention that the employee’s bodily integrity be more stringently 
protected than the employer’s interests.[27]
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It would appear from the prohibition in section 187 that an employee 
may never be forced to undergo a medical intervention. The prospect 
of becoming unemployed, however, plays a significant role in the 
employee’s decision whether to undergo treatment.
Medical practitioners
In Castell v De Greef, the Court confirmed that beneficence does 
not con stitute a legitimate ground to force a patient to undergo 
treat ment.[30] In light of quantitative research recently carried out, 
indicating that over 50% of medical practitioners admit to treating 
patients without consent based on the assumption that they would 
have consented, it is doubtful whether scholarly and judicial opinion 
has, in fact, filtered down into practice.[3] This regrettable position 
somewhat muddies what should be a clear-cut distinction between 
autonomy and beneficence and is potentially indicative of the 
fact that an authoritarian attitude is alive and well among medical 
practitioners.
The above instances in which forced treatment was considered, 
as diverse as they are, have one thing in common: they serve to 
indicate that the right to bodily integrity is a central consideration 
and, in the majority of the cases, the right to bodily integrity cannot 
be limited. It appears that it is only in the case of the state that forced 
treatment is accepted, and even then there remain uncertainties 
and contentious aspects. It is perhaps Hobbes’s theory of the social 
contract which best explains this phenomenon: individuals barter 
away some of their rights in return for protection and the regulation 
of violence by the government entity, in essence entering into a 
contract with society. Therefore, if one commits a crime by violating 
the terms of the contract, one is punished – it is a necessary step in 
working towards punishment that the crime must be investigated, 
which requires evidence to be obtained by various means, including 
blood tests and surgery. In addition, in ensuring the protection of 
the interest of others, certain individuals may be required to endure 
the limitation of their rights. This situation can arise, as indicated 
above, through forced treatment for a communicable and deadly 
disease, HIV tests to protect and empower the victims of rape and 
other sexual offences and DNA tests to determine the paternity of 
children.
Conclusion
Forced treatment as opposed to the right to physical integrity 
(and the ethical duty of respect for autonomy) captures an age-
old conflict for medical practitioners: to treat the patient or to 
respect their wishes regardless of the negative consequences 
that their choice may have on their health. Control by the state, 
medical practitioners, family or others should be allowed only in the 
most limited of circumstances. It should be the norm that patients’ 
decisions to refuse treatment stand, unless the interests of justice or 
the community permit otherwise.
We opened the discussion with reference to the Stransham-Ford 
judgment which, in our view, highlights the medical practitioner’s 
first and foremost ethical duty and legal obligation to respect the 
autonomy and physical integrity of their patient: not only in not 
compelling that patient to undergo medical interventions when they 
decide rather to die with dignity, but also in not coercing a patient to 
undergo other medical interventions against their wishes.
Uncertainty and reticence are the prevailing features in any dis-
cussion of forced medical interventions. It seems to be uni versally 
under stood that forced medical interventions, for the most part, are 
not desirable but, indeed, necessary in some circumstances. The 
fact that a person makes a decision to refuse a medical intervention, 
a choice which is unusual or may be perceived as irrational does 
not mean that person does not warrant the protection of the 
Constitution and the courts.[31] The rights in the Bill of Rights apply to 
everyone,[2] regardless of how odd or abnormal their decisions may 
appear to a third party. Therefore, when a patient refuses treatment 
it is not the role of the medical practitioner or anyone else to try to 
convince them otherwise, or to disregard that decision. Provided 
that the patient makes an informed refusal while of sound mind 
generally there is no reason to discredit their decision, as difficult 
as it may be to accept. At all times the right to bodily integrity is 
pivotal in any health-related context and should not be lightly 
disregarded.
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